_general_ci American Perceptions of Russian NGO Development and the Need for Evidence 

George E. Hudson

The development of  non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Russia has evoked significant  discussion in the United States among scholars, in the mass media, and within  U.S. governmental circles.&nbsp; No matter  which audience one chooses, one can find within it at least two contending  views expressed about Russia&rsquo;s democratic future&mdash;one based on fear and the other based on hope.&nbsp;  This article argues that both schools of thought need to form their  arguments on more concrete information than exists at present, although it  seems clear that the NGO segment of Russian civil society is becoming more and  more dynamic.
 Two  Contending Groups
 The first group  claims that the NGO movement is in danger because of the establishment of the  &ldquo;power vertical&rdquo; in Russia since Vladimir Putin became president.&nbsp; The law on political parties, the new way in  which Russian governors are chosen, and the apparent more central control of  some elements of the Russian mass media, provides part of the evidence for this  group&rsquo;s view that Russians are losing their freedoms.&nbsp; The new law on NGOs and the establishment of  the Public Chamber in 2006 provide further speculation that Russian authorities  are repressing NGOs.&nbsp; This group&rsquo;s  reactions can border on near hysteria, especially among some in the American  mass media, who have claimed that the new NGO law will lead to the shutting  down of all foreign NGOs and the suppression of Russian domestic ones. &nbsp; Some members of this group begin their  analyses of Russia with the assumption that &ldquo;Russia is not a democracy.&rdquo; 
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The second group, however, counters  the first with the assertion that democratic theory is partly based on the  notion that the number of political parties needs to be limited (as in the  Russia law on parties) to make electoral choices comprehensible to citizens.&nbsp; Russia&rsquo;s federation, moreover, needs to be  centralized following the radical de-centralization during the Yeltsin years to  yield a more rational way of governing the huge country.&nbsp; The new law on NGOs and the creation of the  Public Chamber do not, in principle, violate any democratic norms and may  actually end up protecting Russian NGOs from government excesses at both the  regional and national levels.&nbsp; The NGO  law, this group states, is not much different from similar legislation in  other, democratic nations, such as India, Great Britain, and the United States,  itself. 
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The present author finds himself  much more part of the second group than the first, being convinced that the  first group founds itself partly on parochial, American concepts of what  democracy should be and a non-comparative view of Russian democratic  progress.&nbsp; In addition, evidence that the  author has collected about NGO activity at the regional level indicates that  Russian NGOs are becoming effective organizations and are having a positive  impact on Russian democracy.&nbsp;  Nevertheless, he also has come to understand that there is a strong need  for more evidence about Russia&rsquo;s NGO development.&nbsp; Such evidence can come from two general  sources:&nbsp; broad, aggregate data about  Russian NGOs and information drawn from the intensive study of NGOs at the  local and regional levels.&nbsp; The remainder  of this article will discuss problems with aggregate evidence only.
 The  Number of Russian NGOs
 By 2003 approximately 570,000 NGOs existed in Russia, according to  one Russian source .&nbsp; This number is up considerably from the  approximately 8,500 registered groups in 1993, the 160,000 in 1997 and the  nearly 275,000 in  2000 .&nbsp; The number of registered NGOs reported in any  year varies because of the difficulty in obtaining official data and the  consequent need to rely on secondary sources of information, such as the United  States Information Agency (USIA) or reports of official information from  Russian secondary sources.&nbsp; Sources often  contradict each other.&nbsp; For instance,  Sarah Henderson&rsquo;s reported 275,000   in 2000 do not match a 2000 estimate from a Russian  source reporting 484,949 NGOs &nbsp;(it cites the Russian statistical agency,  Goskomstat, as its source) .&nbsp; Different estimates include different kinds  of groups as NGOs, which may account for the variation.&nbsp; The referenced Goskomstat figures count  municipal organizations, consumer groups, and foundations as well as charitable  organizations, many of which are not normally figured in the term NGO. 
 There can be no question about the tremendous national  growth of NGOs, no matter what the inaccuracies.&nbsp; The present author has calculated four  different estimates of the total number of NGOs up to 2005, all of which begin  with Sarah Henderson&rsquo;s first two approximations from 1993 and 1997 and then use  data for more current years from different Russian sources.&nbsp; Using linear regression (&#1083;&#1080;&#1085;&#1077;&#1081;&#1085;&#1072;&#1103; &#1088;&#1077;&#1075;&#1088;&#1077;&#1089;&#1089;&#1080;&#1103;) we  arrive at four approximations for 2005:&nbsp;  465,005 NGOs; 370,148 NGOs; 771,424 NGOs; and 616,344 NGOs.&nbsp; The average number for 2005 is:&nbsp; 555,730 NGOs.&nbsp; Similarly, the four sets of figures yield  averages of 328,050 NGOs for 2000 and 133,756 NGOs for 1996.&nbsp; It would be useful to have a dependable  source of official data and not have to deal with the approximations. NGOs are  required to register with the Ministry of Justice, but the Ministry does not  make the data available on its web site.&nbsp;  Moreover, Goskomstat is supposed to publish the data, but they are not  included on any web site or in its publication, Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik.&nbsp; &nbsp;
 Adding to these difficulties are other data  problems.&nbsp; First, the overall totals are  not disaggregated into useful categories.&nbsp;  The 2000 Goskomstat data report that there are 144,000 &ldquo;religious and  social organizations,&rdquo; but no indication of the proportions of various  religious denominations or how a social organization is defined.&nbsp;&nbsp; Second, the number of reported NGOs usually  includes only registered NGOs and does not attempt to estimate the number of  unregistered ones.&nbsp; The present author&rsquo;s  own anecdotal evidence, from conversations with Russian NGO specialists and  workers, indicates there are many unregistered groups, which either do not  bother to register or do not have to register, so the numbers may be much  higher&mdash;but by how much it is not possible, at present, to know.&nbsp; Third, the NGOs actually classified as  &ldquo;active&rdquo; NGOs are less than the reported number because, although a group is  registered, it may be dormant.&nbsp; But we  also cannot determine how many are dormant.&nbsp;  Fourth, national level estimates are not disaggregated by region so it  is difficult to get a precise fix on regional growth, unless one goes to  regions to collect information, and then it may not be official data, just  approximations.&nbsp; None of these  qualifications, however, nullifies the original conclusion:&nbsp; the growth of NGOs at the national level has  been phenomenal since the fall of the USSR, yielding strong evidence that this  sector of Russian civil society is healthy, indeed.
 Approximately three to seven percent of the entire  population of Russia is involved in civil society development,  comparable, in some ways, to proportions in democratic nations of earlier  years, where, in 1980, participation exclusively in public interest groups in  the United States, Britain, France, and Germany was not very different from the  Russian figure, even though the rate has increased since. &nbsp; Overall participation rates in the U.S. for  all types of NGOs, however, including church membership and all sorts of  voluntary associations, are much larger than the Russian figures.
 The patterns of rapid growth at the national level are  repeated when examining NGO development at the regional level, although the  caveats about data limitations apply here, as well (local authorities appear to  regard NGO data as a state secret).&nbsp; In  Samara, for instance, NGOs have increased from about 20 NGOs in 1990, to 700 in 1996, 2300 in 2000,  and, again using linear regression to approximate current levels,&nbsp; nearly 4000 in 2005. &nbsp; The top types of NGOs in Samara in 2003 were  those dealing with social protection of certain population groups, such as  children and the handicapped (32% of the total); sports and health care (18%);  culture, art, history (9%); science, education, ecology (8%); human rights  (6%); and professional associations (5%). &nbsp; 
 Even before outside funding for NGOs came to Novgorod in  1997, the number of NGOs increased sixteen times between 1991 and 1996, helping  to demonstrate that interest articulation by the population naturally occurred  in the post-Soviet era in that city (a similar pattern is true for  Samara).&nbsp; By 1996, there were 372  registered NGOs; by 2000, 1208; and by 2005, 1565, using  regression. .&nbsp; The groups experiencing the greatest growth  by 2001 were political groups, including parties (39%); groups for the disabled  (22%); human and civil rights organizations (17%); ecological groups (11%); and  women&rsquo;s associations (11%).  These data are not directly comparable to Samara&rsquo;s because they examine  different categories and because the data give only groups experiencing growth,  not absolute numbers.&nbsp; Nevertheless, the  range of concerns in the two cities is similar, particularly those surrounding  the disabled, ecology and human rights.&nbsp; 
 Volgograd data are available, as well, but they cover  only up to 1999 and more recent data are not possible to obtain.&nbsp; Nevertheless, they indicate much of what has  been noted before: a total increase in numbers over time. &nbsp;&nbsp; As above, the groups tend to concentrate on  assistance to invalids (29%) but also cultural-educational activity (25%), work  with children and teenagers (23%), social and economic assistance to the  unemployed (12%), assistance to pensioners and veterans (11%).&nbsp; It is difficult to compare group activity  from city to city, but it seems clear that social protection stands out as the  clear emphasis upon which regional and local NGOs place their efforts.
 It is useful to add a final note on why the data for  regional growth of NGOs are so important and why national-level data are not  sufficient to get a picture of the development of civil society in Russia  today.&nbsp; Aside from the obvious intrinsic  interest to see what is going on at the local levels, knowing about regional  NGO growth in particular cities can tell us about whether cities are influential  in spreading NGO activity throughout the country.&nbsp; NGO activity in cities and oblasts, such as  the ones listed above, can&mdash;and does&mdash;spread&nbsp;  influence outwards to the surrounding countryside, providing an example  for others to follow and generating an impact beyond the region&rsquo;s boundaries.&nbsp; If enough cities and oblasts perform this  function, then it could cause a rapid acceleration of NGO growth even beyond  that expected.&nbsp; This phenomenon is known  as the &ldquo;tipping point,&rdquo; made famous by Malcolm Gladwell, which has been applied  to the analysis of one particular NGO&rsquo;s activities in Moscow.  The tipping point could help partly to explain why Russia&rsquo;s NGO growth has been  so explosive&mdash;and also so apparently conducive to Russian democratic  development.
 Other Measures of NGO Development
 Two other aggregate measures of Russian NGO development deserve  mention here:&nbsp; the Freedom House Freedom in the World survey and USAID&rsquo;s NGO Sustainability Index. &nbsp; Both are indexes intended to measure the  aggregate performance of freedom, in the case of Freedom House, and NGO  sustainability, for USAID.&nbsp; A part of  Freedom House&rsquo;s measures, called civil liberties, is very similar to the  USAID&rsquo;s sustainability statistic.&nbsp;  Happily, they are graded on the same scale:&nbsp; from 1, indicating high scores (the highest  degree of freedom or the highest degree of sustainability) to 7 (the lowest of  both measures).&nbsp;&nbsp; They use the panel  method to generate the measures in which experts assign scores to various  indicators of freedom or sustainability.&nbsp;  They also are comparative measures in a number of senses:&nbsp; the  indexes can be compared to each other; they both look at a number of countries  for each index (192 for Freedom House; 26 for USAID), so one can compare Russia  to other nations; and the indexes can be used to compare Russia over time  (since 1991 for Freedom House; since 1996 for USAID).
 Thus, the indicators can provide a rich source of data  for the analyst attempting to see how Russia&rsquo;s democracy is progressing.&nbsp; Freedom House assigns summary  characterizations about how a nation is scoring in a particular year. It is  &ldquo;free&rdquo; (1.0-2.5), &ldquo;partly free&rdquo; (3.0-5.0), or &ldquo;not free&rdquo; (5.5-7.0).&nbsp; For 2004, Freedom House ranked Russia as &ldquo;not  free&rdquo; for the first time (with an overall score of 5.5, but with civil  liberties sub-score of 5.0).&nbsp; In 2000,  Russia was assigned an overall score of 5.0, with civil liberties also  obtaining 5.0; in 1996, Russia received a 3.5, with civil liberties at  4.0.&nbsp; In other words, Russia&rsquo;s scores on  freedom declined over time, from &ldquo;partly free&rdquo; to &ldquo;not free,&rdquo; although its  civil liberties score, most comparable to USAID&rsquo;s index, remained at the  &ldquo;partly free&rdquo; level.
 USAID has its own naming scheme for the NGO  sustainability index.&nbsp; Countries with a  score of 1-3 are in a period of democratic &ldquo;consolidation&rdquo;; 3-5, in &ldquo;mid-transition&rdquo;; and  5-7, in  &ldquo;early transition.&rdquo;&nbsp; In 2004, Russia  scored 4.2, slightly improved from the 4.4 of 2003.&nbsp; In 2000, the score equaled 4.3 and in 1997,  3.4.&nbsp; Overall there is a slight trend  toward higher (worse) scores, although Russia remains in &ldquo;mid-transition&rdquo; for  the whole period.
 Comparing these indexes, it appears that, on both,  Russia&rsquo;s overall context for NGO development is worsening&mdash;Russia&rsquo;s civil  liberties are decreasing, as its sustainability, although there is an  improvement for sustainability in 2004.&nbsp;  There are some limitations to be kept in mind when using them:

   The very method of       scoring, using a panel of judges, introduces bias, for which it is       difficult to control.&nbsp; General       tendencies can be revealed, nevertheless, if the same judges are used from       year to year, and if the scoring procedures are consistent and carefully       monitored.
   The use of       quantitative measures has to be related to this context.&nbsp; The numbers are generated by people,       scoring their views; they are not generated via some objective physical       measurement and are, therefore, not precise.&nbsp; Outside observers, who may treat numbers       as objective indicators, need to realize this inherent limitation of the       data.&nbsp; 
   The       characterization each group assigns the overall scores, such as &ldquo;free&rdquo; or       &ldquo;consolidation,&rdquo; even when the research organizations carefully define       them and the sub-factors constituting them (Freedom House and USAID try to       define them carefully) are also easily subject to misinterpretation.&nbsp; This is particularly the case for the       Freedom House scores that made news headlines with the &ldquo;not free&rdquo; rating       of Russia.&nbsp; The news media appeared       to miss entirely the complexity of measures underlying the final       conclusion.&nbsp; Freedom House&rsquo;s press       release announcing the result helped to generate this simplistic       impression, even though it attempted to explain why it reached the       conclusion. &nbsp; Using value-laden terms like &ldquo;free&rdquo; or       &ldquo;not free&rdquo; seem so absolutist that they can easily be misused in the wrong       hands for drawing incorrect judgments or policy conclusions.&nbsp; USAID&rsquo;s terminology about &ldquo;transition&rdquo;       is also subject to misinterpretation, as it begs the question &ldquo;Transition       to what?&rdquo;&nbsp; We assume that it is to       democracy and/or civil society, but that is not clear.&nbsp; There are also values attached to       &ldquo;transition,&rdquo; as to &ldquo;free,&rdquo; but USAID does not appear to emphasize its       characterization as heavily as Freedom House, nor does it appear to attach       as much mathematical significance to its measures.&nbsp; USAID&rsquo;s categories flow more into each       other, unlike Freedom House&rsquo;s, which have clear demarcations between       them.&nbsp; In fact, the measures       underlying them are not precise, as noted above.&nbsp; Overall, USAID&rsquo;s figures appear to be       more useful.
   A final limitation       of Freedom House&rsquo;s index should be noted here.&nbsp; In 1991, when Freedom House first began       to rate Russia, Russia received a score of 3.0 (civil liberties was 3.0,       too), well within the range of &ldquo;partly free&rdquo; and nearly falling into the       category of &ldquo;free.&rdquo;&nbsp; Does that mean       that the USSR under Gorbachev&rsquo;s communist administration was freer than       Russia under Yeltsin or Putin, under whom the number of NGOs has blossomed       and in whose nation one can travel virtually wherever one wants?&nbsp;&nbsp; The data raise at least the previous       question, and perhaps others, dealing with the consistency of scoring and       changes in the Freedom House model of what constitutes &ldquo;freedom.&rdquo;
 
, then, can be concluded about aggregate measures of  NGO activity that underlie assessments of Russian civil society?&nbsp; First, the measures of NGO growth are subject  to many inaccuracies.&nbsp; It is not yet  possible to get official, Russian data of registered groups.&nbsp; It is more difficult to get estimates of the  number of groups that are not registered.&nbsp;  Different secondary sources yield different numbers.&nbsp; Although we cannot be precise in knowing just  how many NGOs exist in Russia, there can be little question that they have  grown remarkably in number since the USSR collapsed, indicating progress in  Russian civil society.&nbsp; Second, aggregate  measures of the trends in civil society development (freedom, sustainability)  also suffer from inaccuracies.&nbsp; But the  tendencies indicate that the context in which the NGO community operates is not  as hospitable as it once was.&nbsp; 
 The reader may be excused for wondering what to make of  these apparent contradictions in the quantitative indicators indicating a  growing NGO community within a more hostile context.&nbsp; It could be that NGOs are growing in spite of  pressures from the center and elsewhere, showing just how strong the movement  has become.&nbsp; Yet, the assessment could  also conclude that broad tendencies in political and social development are  running against NGOs and that eventually civil society will be threatened.&nbsp; Much more work needs to be done to develop  accurate measurements of NGO development at the aggregate level.&nbsp; This need is probably more important for  Russian researchers and policy analysts than it is for American ones.

   
       For instance, see &ldquo;Mr. Putin&rsquo;s Counterrevolution,&rdquo; Washington Post editorial, 17 November  2005, for the view that foreign organizations would be banned under the terms  of the NGO law. 

    James Goldgeier  and Michael McFaul, &ldquo;Russia&rsquo;s No Democracy. So What?&rdquo;&nbsp; Washington Post, April 9, 2006, p. B02

     See, for instance, Mary Dejevsky, &ldquo;Russia&rsquo;s NGO Law: The Wrong  Target,&rdquo; in Opendemocracy.net, as  recorded in Johnson&rsquo;s Russia List,  no. 9319, 16 December 2005; Nicolai Petro, &ldquo;Russian NGO Legislation is a Step  in the Right Direction,&rdquo; Russiaprfile.org, www.russiaprofile.org/politics/2005/12/9/2864/wbp.
     4Federal News  Service, www.fednews.ru.&nbsp; 2003.&nbsp;  &ldquo;Press Conference With a Group of Experts Regarding the Results of  Social Research on Democracy in Russia.&rdquo;&nbsp;  As transmitted in Johnson&rsquo;s Russia  List, no. 7399, November 4, 2003.
     5 Sarah  Henderson.&nbsp; Building Democracy in Contemporary Russia: Western Support for  Grassroots Organizations.&nbsp; Ithaca:&nbsp; Cornell University Press, 2003,  p. 42. 
   &nbsp;
   &nbsp;
   &nbsp; 

   &nbsp;

 
    &#1040;&#1085;&#1085;&#1072;  &#1057;&#1077;&#1074;&#1086;&#1088;&#1090;&#1100;&#1103;&#1085;,&nbsp; &ldquo;&#1058;&#1077;&#1088;&#1088;&#1080;&#1090;&#1086;&#1088;&#1080;&#1103; &#1053;&#1050;&#1054;: &#1075;&#1088;&#1072;&#1085;&#1080;&#1094;&#1099;  &#1086;&#1090;&#1082;&#1088;&#1099;&#1090;&#1099;.&rdquo; &#1048;&#1079;&#1076;&#1072;&#1085;&#1080;&#1103; &#1076;&#1083;&#1103; &#1085;&#1077;&#1082;&#1086;&#1084;&#1084;&#1077;&#1088;&#1095;&#1077;&#1089;&#1082;&#1080;&#1093;  &#1086;&#1088;&#1075;&#1072;&#1085;&#1080;&#1079;&#1072;&#1094;&#1080;&#1081;, 2000.&nbsp; http://ngo-books.narod.ru/e-materials/0001.htm 

     Federal News Service, op.  cit.

     George E. Hudson,  &ldquo;Civil Society in Russia: Models and Prospects for Development.&rdquo; The Russian Review 62 (April 2003):&nbsp; 212-222, p. 214; Russell J. Dalton, Citizen Politics, 3rd Edition  (New York: Chatham House, 2002), p. 46.

     &#1050;&#1086;&#1085;&#1094;&#1077;&#1087;&#1094;&#1080;&#1103; &#1087;&#1072;&#1088;&#1090;&#1085;&#1077;&#1088;&#1089;&#1090;&#1074;&#1072; &#1086;&#1088;&#1075;&#1072;&#1085;&#1086;&#1074;  &#1075;&#1086;&#1089;&#1091;&#1076;&#1072;&#1088;&#1089;&#1090;&#1074;&#1077;&#1085;&#1085;&#1086;&#1081; &#1074;&#1083;&#1072;&#1089;&#1090;&#1080; &#1057;&#1072;&#1084;&#1072;&#1088;&#1089;&#1082;&#1086;&#1081; &#1086;&#1073;&#1083;&#1072;&#1089;&#1090;&#1080;, &#1086;&#1088;&#1075;&#1072;&#1085;&#1086;&#1074; &#1084;&#1077;&#1089;&#1090;&#1085;&#1086;&#1075;&#1086; &#1089;&#1072;&#1084;&#1086;&#1091;&#1087;&#1088;&#1072;&#1074;&#1083;&#1077;&#1085;&#1080;&#1103; &#1080;  &#1085;&#1077;&#1075;&#1086;&#1089;&#1091;&#1076;&#1072;&#1088;&#1089;&#1090;&#1074;&#1077;&#1085;&#1085;&#1099;&#1093; &#1085;&#1077;&#1082;&#1086;&#1084;&#1084;&#1077;&#1088;&#1095;&#1077;&#1089;&#1082;&#1080;&#1093; &#1086;&#1088;&#1075;&#1072;&#1085;&#1080;&#1079;&#1072;&#1094;&#1080;&#1081; &#1087;&#1086; &#1088;&#1072;&#1079;&#1074;&#1080;&#1090;&#1080;&#1102; &#1075;&#1088;&#1072;&#1078;&#1076;&#1072;&#1085;&#1089;&#1082;&#1086;&#1075;&#1086; &#1086;&#1073;&#1097;&#1077;&#1089;&#1090;&#1074;&#1072;.&nbsp; 2003.&nbsp; http://www.adm.samara.ru/content/14/547/15348/;  &#1055;&#1086;&#1074;&#1086;&#1083;&#1078;&#1100;&#1077; NGO  Center, information provided to the author.

    &#1055;&#1086;&#1074;&#1086;&#1083;&#1078;&#1100;&#1077; NGO Center,  information provided to the author. 

    Nicolai N. Petro, Crafting Democracy: How Novgorod Has  Coped with Rapid Social Change (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), p.  52 .
     &nbsp;

     Ibid., p. 53

    &#1048;.&#1048;.  &#1050;&#1091;&#1088;&#1080;&#1083;&#1083;&#1072;, &#1048;.&#1057;. &#1050;&#1091;&#1096;&#1085;&#1077;&#1088;&#1091;&#1082;, &#1058;.&#1042;. &#1050;&#1072;&#1084;&#1077;&#1085;&#1089;&#1082;&#1072;&#1103;, &#1053;&#1077;&#1082;&#1086;&#1084;&#1084;&#1077;&#1088;&#1095;&#1077;&#1089;&#1082;&#1080;&#1081;  &#1089;&#1077;&#1082;&#1090;&#1086;&#1088; &#1075;. &#1042;&#1086;&#1083;&#1075;&#1086;&#1075;&#1088;&#1072;&#1076;&#1072;: &#1089;&#1086;&#1089;&#1090;&#1086;&#1103;&#1085;&#1080;&#1077; &#1080; &#1087;&#1077;&#1088;&#1089;&#1087;&#1077;&#1082;&#1090;&#1080;&#1074;&#1099; &#1088;&#1072;&#1079;&#1074;&#1080;&#1090;&#1080;&#1103; (&#1042;&#1086;&#1083;&#1075;&#1086;&#1075;&#1088;&#1072;&#1076;:  &#1048;&#1079;&#1076;&#1072;&#1090;&#1077;&#1083;&#1100;&#1089;&#1090;&#1074;&#1086; &#1042;&#1086;&#1083;&#1075;&#1086;&#1075;&#1088;&#1072;&#1076;&#1089;&#1082;&#1086;&#1075;&#1086; &#1075;&#1086;&#1089;&#1091;&#1076;&#1072;&#1088;&#1089;&#1090;&#1074;&#1077;&#1085;&#1085;&#1086;&#1075;&#1086; &#1091;&#1085;&#1080;&#1074;&#1077;&#1088;&#1089;&#1080;&#1090;&#1077;&#1090;&#1072;, 1999), &#1089;&#1090;&#1088;. 12-13.
     &nbsp;

    Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can  Make a Big Difference (Boston:&nbsp;  Little, Brown and Co., 2002); Lana Ivanitskaya, &ldquo;The Development of  Civil Society in Russia: Murziks and the Lessons from the Tipping Point.&rdquo;&nbsp; Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the  American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies.&nbsp; Salt Lake City, November, 2005.
   &nbsp;

     Freedom House, Freedom in the World, 2005.&nbsp; http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15&amp;year=2005;  USAID,&nbsp; &ldquo;The 2004 NGO Sustainability  Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia,&rdquo; 2004 http://www.usaid.gov/locations/europe_eurasia/dem_gov/ngoindex/2004/index.htm

     Freedom  House,&ldquo;Press Release.&rdquo;&nbsp; December 20,  2004. http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=70&amp;release=242

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