_general_ci Heroes of Our Time 

Artem Zagorodnov

of President  Vladimir Putin’s most misunderstood policies has been his approach to the  conflict in Chechnya. Unfortunately many correspondents attempt to mold the reality in the  Caucasus into the classic situation of a major  power bullying one of its rogue provinces, whose people only desire a breath of  sovereignty to rid themselves of exploitation. The truth, however, does not fit  any standard model, nor can it be formed or simplified into a bestseller plot  about a nationalistic, democracy-hating tyrant reigning in the wary  constituents of his fallen empire. 
 To analyze the Kremlin’s current strategy in the Caucasus, we must examine several important facts that  are too often overlooked:
 1. The start of the Second Chechen War was not the  result of nationalistic policies pursued by Putin ahead of elections, but directly  caused by the Chechens’ outright war against neighboring Russian territories.
 2. The ‘political solution’ to the conflict that is so  often touted was not a possibility against the backdrop of chaos and terrorism  being spread by rebel commanders prior to the start of the second war.
 3. The violence and terrorist acts throughout Russia that are repeatedly blamed on Putin’s Chechnya  policy were already occurring before the war’s beginning.
 4. Predictions for the Chechen war spreading throughout  the entire region, or for the ‘Chechenization’ of the Caucasus,  are largely unfounded and fail to take into account critical facts of the  situation in neighboring republics.
 5. Despite the much-deserved criticism directed at the  local Kadyrov regime, the recent parliamentary elections are a major step  toward genuine democracy and stability in Chechnya.
 The Start of the War
 What is almost never emphasized in reports about Chechnya is the cause of the present war: it was  the Chechens who attacked Russia  in August of 1999 to begin the Second Chechen War. After the signing of the  Khasavyurt Treaty on August   31st, 1996 by General Alexander Lebed and Aslan Maskhadov, Chechnya de-facto earned its long-sought independence.  Russian military and law enforcement units were withdrawn from Chechen  soil, internationally recognized elections that solidified Maskhadov’s role as  leader of Chechnya were held  and, what is almost never mentioned, Russia  continued to provide free gas and electricity supplies to Chechnya, as well as pay pensions  to its elderly. The question of Chechnya’s  official political status was postponed for five years.
 By various accounts, including Paul Klebnikov’s notable book Godfather of the Kremlin, Chechnya descended into a state of virtual  anarchy following Russia’s  withdrawal, with President Maskhadov being unable to wrestle control from the  various warlords ruling Chechnya’s  territory. In the capital itself, an open slave market operated across the  street from the Presidential Palace. The region became a haven for illicit arms  and drug trade. The rebel commanders who had so zealously fought for Chechnya’s  freedom proved themselves completely incapable of rebuilding any type of national  economy or establishing rule of law.
 Realizing they had failed, the rebels launched an  offensive against Russia.  This time they promised to occupy all territories south of the Black Sea (to which they had no historical or ethnic claim).  By various estimates armies containing over 2,000 or 3,000 rebels attacked the  neighboring Russian region of Dagestan in  August of 1999, taking control of several villages. Under the orders of the then Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin, the Russian  army successfully repelled the terrorists. The Chechens, under the  leadership of notorious warlord Shamil Basayev, led a second major invasion.  Only after this did the Russian army pursue the warlords back onto their own  territory.  : out of the questionthe incoming prime minister Putin ordered the start  of the Second Chechen War, the Russian military had already bombed Chechen  military compounds as a warning against further aggression and received  President Maskhadov’s refusal to extradite Basayev. A political solution within such a context was not an option. Whether  Maskhadov or other internal ‘political factions’ had supported the war against Russia  is irrelevant – Russian citizens were being slaughtered on their own territory  by invading Chechen armies.
 Many analysts chose to portray Maskhadov as a benevolent  peacemaker, a symbol of the Chechens’ struggle for freedom. In fact, he could  more accurately be called a “piece-maker.” Regardless of what his intentions  were, Mr. Maskhadov completely failed to bring any semblance of order or  prosperity to Chechnya  during his reign. The Second Chechen War began with chaos within the republic  and his own subordinates leading a war against the neighboring Russian  population. Putin asked him to extradite those responsible; instead Maskhadov’s  government initially refused to even admit that an invasion of Dagestan was taking place. When he was faced with the  choice of acknowledging his own failure or joining the ranks of terrorists,  Maskhadov chose the latter. A number of other prominent rebels from the  first war, like the Mufti of Chechnya Akhmad-Khadji Kadyrov, did not.Caucasus on Firefact, the invasion of Dagestan in August of 1999 had  not been the first attack on Russia  by such terrorists during Mr. Maskhadov’s rule. The Chechen warlords had long  made a lucrative business of kidnapping hostages and demanding ransoms. In May  of 1998, Russia’s  presidential representative to Chechnya  was kidnapped and held for six months before being ruthlessly slaughtered.  Later that year, four engineers from Britain  and New Zealand  were executed by Chechen terrorists. A market blast in the Russian city of Vladikavkaz in March of  1999 claimed the lives of 57 people, while the feared commander Salman Raduyev  made no secret of his plan to carry out an attack on a Russian nuclear plant in  the near future. The terrorist acts that are today so often blamed on Putin’s Chechnya  policies are, in fact, merely continuations of the massacres Chechen terrorists  were carrying out long before Mr. Putin appeared on the national political  scene. They were connected not to any independence movement (independence had  already been achieved in 1996), but to the rebels’ inability to form a stable  government or working economy and to Mr. Maskhadov’s personal weakness at dealing  with terrorists on his own territory. 
 We must keep this in mind when analyzing the Kremlin’s  current role in Chechnya,  especially in regards to establishing democracy. In his December 21st,  2005 Moscow Times article, Svante E. Cornell attacked Putin’s policies, writing  that “the [recent parliamentary] elections [did] nothing to improve the  deadlock in Chechnya and the  rapidly deteriorating situation in the North Caucasus  as a whole.” However, he also acknowledged that “the human and material  destruction and the collapse of civic norms and values [in Chechnya] have  undercut the very functioning of society, creating a fertile breeding ground  for radicalism among a young generation that has known nothing but violence and  deprivation.” 
 In this lies the key to understanding Putin’s strategy  for Chechnya:  a genuine democracy can only function with the presence of a number of critical  institutions. Democracy is dependent upon civil society – people respecting the  system that governs them, willing to obey the laws and to protect their own  rights as well as those of others. When citizens are struggling to survive,  they cannot be expected to care about their responsibilities before society.
 In Chechnya  basic security continues to be a major problem today, to say nothing of the  poverty of the region or the complete absence of a middle class. This lack of  security was present long before Mr. Putin initiated his Chechnya policy and was spreading from the  boundaries of Chechnya to  the entire Caucasus, culminating in the invasions of Dagestan  in 1999. Before democracy could take shape, security needed to be guaranteed,  and this is exactly the policy Putin has pursued.
 This last year has seen substantial progress toward  peace: the number of Russian military casualties in the republic has decreased  by several times, as has the number of kidnappings. In fact, the Russian  federal army had just 28 casualties in Chechnya in all of 2005. An  explosion taking the lives of 14 civilians in July of last year received  national attention, with Chechen President Alu Alkhanov personally visiting the  site of the terrorist act. Such recognition would have been unimaginable just a  few years ago, when analogous events occurred almost daily and were too numerous  to receive much attention.  Oksana Yablokova, in a December 20th, 2005 Moscow Times article, asserted  that the recent UN and EU’s parallel decisions to focus assistance to the North  Caucasus toward stimulating the regional economies and creating jobs, rather  than giving direct food and medical aid, represents the international bodies’ recognition  of the increasing stabilization of the area.  Just recently, the South Korean conglomerate Samsung announced its serious  consideration of establishing a gold production facility in the Caucasus republic of Karachayevo-Cherkessia. Such a move  would pour serious investments into the depressed region. are always keen to assert that the Chechen  conflict is, in fact, spreading to other parts of the Caucasus.  One of the most violent such events was the raid on the Ingush city of Nazran  in June of 2004, in which over 90 civilians and law enforcement officials were  killed. A similar raid occurred on the city of Nalchik in October of this year. What very few  reports articulated was how much more successfully law enforcement officials  responded to the second raid. The rebels failed to take any of their six  strategic targets in the city other than a sporting goods store, less than 40  civilians and police were killed and over 90 terrorists were eliminated by  Russian forces. A number of publications simply combined the total casualties  of rebels and Russian forces during the second raid and compared those to the  civilian casualties of the first. In fact, Shamil Basayev himself acknowledged  in an interview that the second raid had been a blunder. The response to the Nalchik raid, as well as the relative serenity of the Caucasus during the last few months, leaves hope that the  combined efforts of the Kremlin and of local officials will lead to peace in  the region. 
 Another favorite accusation of Putin’s opponents is that  the neighboring Russian republic   of Dagestan is on the  brink of a Chechen-style civil war. One notorious Nezavisimaya Gazeta headline in June of last year even pronounced:  “Dagestan – the Second Chechnya.” These  assertions are not entirely unfounded: 10 special forces soldiers were killed  in Dagestan last July when a truck carrying  them to a bathhouse exploded. An explosion in the capital Makhachkala in early September killed four  people, and that same month saw another explosion at a roadside checkpoint and  the assassination of a local administrative head. In fact Dagestan experienced  over 70 terrorist attacks during the first half of 2005, albeit most of them very  minor, which was more than in any other Russian region, including Chechnya. 
 These statistics led to serious attention from top  people in the Kremlin. Following the Beslan attack, one of Putin’s closest  allies, Dmitry Kozak, has been personally overseeing the stabilization program  in the Caucasus as the president’s representative to the Southern   Federal District. In a report leaked in June to a prominent Moscow newspaper, Kozak underlined his thorough  familiarity with the situation in Dagestan and  concern for the republic’s wellbeing. Since September Dagestan  has noticeably quieted down, with no major terrorist attacks having been  reported. In February of 2006, the ailing 75-year-old leader of the republic,  Magomedali Magomedov, finally stepped down, clearing the way for the prominent  speaker of parliament, Mukhu Aliyev, to become the republic’s first president. Even  the Kremlin’s harshest critics admit that Aliyev is an uncorrupted leader  familiar with the situation in Dagestan. The  explosion of violence and clan warfare that some publications predicted would  follow the transfer of power in Dagestan never  occurred. 
 Those predicting a Chechen-style independence movement  in Dagestan are ignoring several critical  facts that differentiate the republic from its western neighbor. The original  Chechen independence movement came as a result of large-scale,  ethnically-motivated calls for separation. Over two thirds of population of Chechnya is  ethnic Chechen. Dagestan, however, is much  more diverse with over 30 ethnic groups, the major ones being the Avars and  Dargins. No one group has anything close to a clear majority of the total  population, hence a republic-wide independence movement on ethnic grounds  similar to that of Chechnya’s is simply impossible. In fact the significance of  February’s change of authority in Dagestan  lies in the fact that Magomedov, an ethnic Dargin, transferred his power to  Aliyev, an Avar, leaving hope that the relatively peaceful coexistence of the  two major groups during the 20th century can continue.  Furthermore Chechnya  is an oil-rich region that had good prospects for establishing its own  functioning economy during its independence movement. Dagestan, however, is a  predominantly agricultural region, with over 70% of the republican budget being  subsidized by Moscow.  The people of Dagestan understand this, and hence have little desire to  politically separate from Russia  and see that money disappear. for Peaceof the most promising signs that the situation in the  Caucasus is stabilizing is the Kremlin’s  progressive position on the issue. Putin and a number of key government  officials have emphasized repeatedly that terrorism is merely a symptom, that  the actual problem is poverty throughout the region. Anyone who saw Putin’s  recent address to the Chechen parliament during his surprise visit to Grozny will agree that it  was one of the most emotional speeches he has ever made during his political  career. Putin admitted before the Chechen people the atrocities that Russia had committed on their land; he  reiterated that the rebellion did not appear out of nowhere, but occurred  largely because of Russia’s  past abuses against the Chechens.
 Unfortunately, massive violations of human rights,  particularly kidnappings, continue in the republic. Neither the local  authorities nor the Kremlin deny this. Chechnya has been rife with war and  destitution for the last 10 years, leaving us to hope for a gradual improvement  in the situation through a return to normalcy. The increasing stability  in the republic has allowed for parliamentary elections, which is a major step  toward democracy. The former defense  minister in Maskhadov’s government (Khambiev) ran with an opposition  party (SPS) and won. To suggest that a high-ranking former rebel taking  a seat in parliament from the opposition is not a part of a political solution  to the Chechen conflict is absurd. 
 Much of the criticism the Kremlin receives in regards to  Chechnya  is undoubtedly necessary and often deserved. It would be much more constructive,  however, to direct that criticism at specific issues in the republic that need  to be resolved rather than to portray Putin as a warmonger and persecutor, to depict  the war as the plot of a Tom Clancy novel, complete with heroes and villains.  The European Union and United Nations have taken their first steps in this  direction. We can hope that others will follow suit.

Cited
 Abdullayev, Nabi. “Dagestan Confirms Aliyev as  Republic’s First President.” TheMoscowTimes.com. 21 Feb. 2006. The Moscow Times. 5 Mar. 2006  &lt;http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2006/02/21/016.html&gt;.
 Cornell, Svante E. “A Virtual Election in a Fantasy Chechnya.” TheMoscowTimes.com. 21 Dec. 2005. The Moscow Times. 7 Mar. 2006 &lt;http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2005/12/21/006.html&gt;.
 Humber, Yuriy. “Samsung’s Bid for Gold in the Caucasus.” TheMoscowTimes.com. 28 Feb. 2006. The Moscow Times. 8 Mar. 2006 &lt;http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2006/02/28/003.html&gt;.
 Klebnikov, Paul. Godfather of the Kremlin: The Decline  of Russia  in the Age of Gangster Capitalism. United States of America: Harcourt,  Inc., 2000.
 Latynina, Yulia. “Dagestan  Needs More Than a New Leader.” TheMoscowTimes.com. 22 Feb. 2006. The Moscow Times. 7 Mar. 2006  &lt; http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2006/02/22/007.html&gt;.
 Liss, Artyom. “Dark shadows in ‘normal’ Chechnya.” BBC  News. 27 Feb. 2006. BBC. 9 Mar. 2006 &lt;http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4757274.stm&gt;.
 Maksakov, Ilya.  “The Chance to Make a Choice.” Russia Profile. Dec. 2005: 7-8.
 “Russia  says rebel assault over; toll tops 100.” MSNBC.com. 14 Oct. 2005. MSNBC.  6 Mar. 2006 &lt;http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9681595&gt;.
 “Timeline: Chechnya.” BBC News. 8 Mar.  2006. BBC. 9 Mar. 2006 &lt;http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/country_profiles/2357267.stm&gt;.
 Walker, Shaun. “Dagestan  – On the Edge.” Russia Profile. Oct. 2005: 8-10., Oksana. “UN, EU Aim to Revive Caucasus Economy.” TheMoscowTimes.com. 20 Dec.  2005. The Moscow  Times. 8 Jan. 2006 &lt;http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2005/12/20/002.html&gt;.

   
       Klebnikov, Paul. Godfather of the Kremlin: The Decline of Russia  in the Age of Gangster Capitalism. United States of America: Harcourt,  Inc., 2000. 

     “Timeline: Chechnya.” BBC News. 8 Mar.  2006. BBC. 9 Mar. 2006 &lt;http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/country_profiles/2357267.stm&gt;.

     Cornell, Svante E.  “A Virtual Election in a Fantasy Chechnya.” TheMoscowTimes.com.  21 Dec. 2005. The Moscow  Times. 7 Mar. 2006  &lt;http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2005/12/21/006.html&gt;.

     Liss, Artyom. “Dark shadows in ‘normal’ Chechnya.” BBC  News. 27 Feb. 2006. BBC. 9 Mar. 2006  &lt;http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4757274.stm&gt;.

     Yablokova, Oksana.  “UN, EU Aim to Revive Caucasus Economy.” TheMoscowTimes.com.  20 Dec. 2005. The Moscow  Times. 8 Jan. 2006 &lt;http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2005/12/20/002.html&gt;.

     Humber, Yuriy. “Samsung’s Bid for Gold in the Caucasus.” TheMoscowTimes.com. 28 Feb. 2006. The Moscow Times. 8 Mar. 2006  &lt;http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2006/02/28/003.html&gt;.

     “Russia  says rebel assault over; toll tops 100.” MSNBC.com. 14 Oct. 2005. MSNBC.  29 Jan. 2006 &lt;http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9681595&gt;.

     Walker,  Shaun. “Dagestan – On the Edge.” Russia Profile. Oct. 2005: 8-10.

     Latynina, Yulia. “Dagestan Needs More Than a New Leader.” TheMoscowTimes.com.  22 Feb. 2006. The Moscow  Times. 7 Mar. 2006 &lt;  http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2006/02/22/007.html&gt;.

     Abdullayev, Nabi.  “Dagestan Confirms Aliyev as Republic’s First President.” TheMoscowTimes.com.  21 Feb. 2006. The Moscow  Times. 5 Mar. 2006 &lt;http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2006/02/21/016.html&gt;.

     Walker, Shaun. “Dagestan – On the  Edge.” Russia Profile. Oct. 2005: 8-10.

     Maksakov,  Ilya. “The Chance to Make a Choice.” Russia Profile. Dec.  2005: 7-8.

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